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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the growth effect of subsidy policies in a modified R&D-based growth 
model of Romer (1990), in which both innovation and capital accumulation are engines of 
long-run economic growth.  We show that, under certain conditions, subsidizing the R&D 
sector may be growth-impeding.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 R&D subsidy policies are now commonly adopted in developing and developed 
countries the world over.  Popular views are that R&D subsidies direct resources to 
innovative activities, and thus can stimulate economic growth.  This view has been 
testified within the framework of classic innovation-led endogenous growth models 
(Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).  These and 
numerous subsequent studies basically support that R&D subsidies have in general 
positive effects on long-run growth.  Empirical evidences, on the other hand, are less 
2 
 
clear about the positive effects of these policies on productivity growth (see, e.g., 
Beason and Weinstein, 1996; Westmore, 2013). 
 In this paper, we analyze the effects of subsidy policies on long-run growth in an 
expanding-variety R&D-based growth model, developed by Romer (1990), with both 
innovation and capital accumulation being the engines of long-run economic growth 
(e.g., Chu et al., 2012; Iwaisako and Futagami, 2013).  The subsidy policies under 
consideration include a subsidy for the costs (of the employment of workers) in three 
sectors: the final-good sector, the R&D sector, and the capital-producing sector.1  
Our analysis shows that subsidizing the final-good sector is growth-impeding.  
However, subsidizing the other two sectors has uncertain effects on long-run growth.  
This finding implies that the typical view that a subsidy for R&D leads to faster 
growth does not necessarily hold.  Intuitively, the R&D sector and the 
capital-producing sector are both contributive to economic growth.  Given the fact 
that the two sectors compete over labor, when an R&D subsidy is implemented, an 
increased R&D investment in the form of an expansion in R&D workers tends to 
crowd out available inputs for the capital-producing sector.  This leads to two 
conflicting effects on growth, and the overall effect then should hinge upon the 
relative importance of the two sectors.  As will be shown below, if the productivity 
of the capital-producing sector is dominant, subsidizing R&D may depress long-run 
growth.   
 Our study is related to the literature on the effects of R&D subsidy policies in 
R&D-based growth models.  Davidson and Segerstrom (1998) consider two types of 
                                                 
1
 Subsidizing production costs of R&D is an approach that have been most commonly adopted in the 
literature (e.g., Zeng and Zhang, 2007; Grossmann and Steger, 2013; Grossmann et al., 2013; Chu et al., 
2015).  As for the subsidy to the final-good sector, we consider a subsidy to the hiring of final-good 
workers, simply for the purpose of easy comparison.  Our main result will not change if we consider 
other types of subsidies for final goods production.   
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R&D (innovative R&D and imitative R&D), and find that subsidies on different types 
of R&D result in different growth effects.  Segerstrom (2000) employs the Howitt’s 
(1999) model without scale effects, and shows that R&D subsidies can have 
ambiguous effects on growth.  Zeng and Zhang (2007) and Gómez and Sequeira 
(2014) provide quantitative evaluation for the effects of R&D subsidies on both 
growth and welfare.  By adopting a semi-endogenous growth model of Jones (1995), 
Grossmann and Steger (2013) and Grossmann et al. (2013) explore the optimal R&D 
subsidization, but their studies are absent from the long-run growth effects due to the 
nature of a semi-endogenous growth model.  The present study contributes to this 
strand of literature by considering both R&D and capital accumulation as engines of 
long-run growth, and by showing that the growth effects of an R&D subsidy depend 
on the relative productivity between these two sectors.  
2. The model 
 We modify the basic model of Chu et al. (2012) by (i) introducing subsidies, (ii) 
removing money, and (iii) assuming inelastic labor supply.  We now briefly describe 
the model structure.  
2.1. Households 
 There is a unit continuum of households.  The population is stationary.  The 
lifetime utility is 
0
  
t
tU e u dt
ρ∞ −
= ∫ ,            (1) 
where lnt tu C= , tC  is the consumption of final goods, and >0ρ  is the subjective 
discount rate.  The total labor supply of each household is fixed and normalized to 
unity.2  Thus, the household’s budget constraint is t t t t t ta r a w C T= + − − , where ta  
                                                 
2
 To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the total labor supply is inelastic, but our results are 
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is the household’s asset, tr  is the interest rate, tw  is the wage rate,
3
 and tT  is the 
lump-sum tax.  The usual Keynes-Ramsey rule is: 
  
t
t
t
C
r
C
ρ= −

.            (2) 
2.2. Final goods 
Final goods tY  (the numeraire) are produced by competitive firms using labor 
and a continuum of intermediate goods: 
  
1
, 0
( )tAt Y t tY L x i diα α−= ∫ ,          (3) 
where 
,Y tL  is labor in final goods production, ( )tx i  is the intermediate good of type 
i
 ( [0, ]ti A∈ ), and tA  is the number of varieties of intermediate goods.  Denoting 
( )tp i  as the price of ( )tx i  relative to final goods, the profit function of the final 
goods firm is  
, , 0
(1 ) ( ) ( )tAY t t Y t Y t t tY s w L p i x i dipi = − − − ∫ ,       (4) 
where Ys  is the subsidy on the employment of final-goods labor.  The conditional 
demand functions are: 
,
(1 )
(1 )
t
Y t
Y t
YL
s w
α−
=
−
,           (5) 
1
1
,
( ) ( )t Y t t
x i L
p i
αα − =   
.          (6) 
2.3. Intermediate goods 
 There is a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods ( )tx i , [0, ]ti A∈ .  
Each intermediate firm is owned by a monopolist who uses one unit of capital tk  to 
                                                                                                                                            
qualitatively robust to a more general utility function ln ln(1- )t t tu C Lη= +  where tL  denotes the 
endogenous labor supply.  Deviations are available from the authors upon request.   
3
 We assume that labor is perfectly mobile across sectors, which implies a unified wage rate. 
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produce one unit of intermediate good, i.e., ( ) ( )t tx i k i= .  Thus, the monopolistic 
profit is 
,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x t t t t ti p i x i q k ipi = − , where tq  is the capital rental price.  Profit 
maximization yields the familiar pricing rule ( ) /t tp i q α= , which implies that the 
intermediate firms are symmetric.  Therefore, we can drop notation i  for variables 
,
{ , , , }t t t x tx p k pi .  The profit then can be simplified to:  
  
,
1( )
x t t tq k
α
pi
α
−
= .           (7) 
The market-clearing condition for capital goods is 
0
( )tA t t t tx i di A x K= =∫ , where tK  
is aggregate capital.  For future use, it is also helpful to derive the conditions from (6) 
and (7) that 2t t tq K Yα=  and ( ), 1t x t tA Ypi α α= − . 
2.4. R&D 
 In the competitive R&D sector, the value of a variety, denoted as 
,A tv , follows 
the no-arbitrage condition: 
  
, , ,t A t x t A trv vpi= +  ,           (8) 
which states that the return of investment in R&D will be equal to the monopolistic 
profit 
,x tpi  plus the capital gain ,A tv .  The R&D firm employs labor to produce new 
varieties with the technology 
,t t A tA A Lϕ= , where the parameter ϕ  determines the 
R&D productivity and 
,A tL  is labor used in R&D.  The government may provide 
subsidies As  for the employment of R&D workers.  The profit of R&D is: 
  
, . ,
(1 )A t A t t A t A tv A s w Lpi = − − .         (9) 
The zero-profit condition implies: 
.
(1 )A t t A tv A s wϕ = − .           (10) 
2.5. Capital production 
 Let us denote the value of one unit of capital as 
,K tv .  The no-arbitrage 
6 
 
condition for 
,K tv  is: 
  
, ,t K t t K trv q v= +  ,           (11) 
which states that the return of investment in capital production is equal to its rental 
price tq  plus the capital gains ,K tv .  Capital goods are produced by a unit of 
continuum competitive firms that employ labor 
,K tL .  The corresponding production 
technology is tKtt LKK ,δ= , where δ  is a parameter reflecting the productivity in 
the capital-producing sector.4  The government may provide subsidies Ks  for the 
capital-producing firms to hire labor.  The profit of a capital-producing firm is: 
  
, . ,
(1 )K t K t t K t K tv K s w Lpi = − − .         (12) 
The zero-profit condition implies: 
,
(1 )K t t K tv K s wδ = − .          (13) 
2.6. The government, market clearing, and aggregation  
 The government levies a lump-sum tax on the households to finance its subsidy 
policies: 
  
, , ,t Y t Y t A t A t K t K tT s w L s w L s w L= + + .        (14) 
The market-clearing conditions for capital goods and the labor market are: 
  
0
( )tAt t t tK x i di A x= =∫ ,           (15) 
  
, , ,
1Y t A t K tL L L+ + = .          (16) 
The household’s asset ta  contains the investment in R&D and in capital production, 
i.e., 
, ,t A t t K t ta v A v K= + .  Accordingly, the resource constraint for final goods can be 
calculated as t tY C= . 
3. Long-run growth effects of subsidy policies 
                                                 
4
 Chu et al. (2012) specify that tKtt LK ,Ωδ= , where tΩ  reflects the technology level.  To permit 
sustained growth, they further assume tt K=Ω  to capture the capital externality in the AK model.  
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 On the balanced growth path, the allocations of labor are stationary, which can 
be derived as (a tilde denotes the steady-state value): 
  
1
1Y
L ξ+=
+Φ

,            (17a) 
  
(1 ) 1
(1 ) 1
Y
A
A
sL
s
α ξ ρ
ϕ
− += −
− +Φ

,         (17b) 
  
2(1 ) 1
(1 )(1 ) 1
Y
K
K
sL
s
α ξ ρ
α δ
− += −
− − +Φ

,        (17c) 
where  
1 1ξ ρδ ϕ
 ≡ +    and 
1(1 )
1 (1 )(1 )Y A K
s
s s
α
α
α
 Φ ≡ − + − − − 
 
are composite parameters.  To ensure that AL  and KL  are non-negative, we 
impose the following restrictions on the two productivity parameters:  
Condition 1. (1 )(1 )ˆ (1 )(1 )
A
Y
s
s
ρϕ ϕ α ξ
− +Φ≥ =
− +
 and ( )( )2
(1 )(1 ) 1
ˆ
(1 ) 1
K
Y
s
s
ρ αδ δ α ξ
− − + Φ
≥ =
− +
. 
The first inequality of Condition 1 ensures that 0AL ≥  and the second ensures that 
0KL ≥ .  From (17a)-(17c), the following lemma holds: 
Lemma 1. The effects of subsidies on equilibrium labor allocations are: 
  0
~
>
∂
∂
A
A
s
L
; 0
~
<
∂
∂
A
Y
s
L
; 0
~
<
∂
∂
A
K
s
L
,         (18a) 
0
~
>
∂
∂
K
K
s
L
; 0
~
<
∂
∂
K
Y
s
L
; 0
~
<
∂
∂
K
A
s
L
,         (18b) 
0
~
>
∂
∂
Y
Y
s
L
; 0
~
<
∂
∂
Y
A
s
L
; 0
~
<
∂
∂
Y
K
s
L
.         (18c) 
Proof. Straightforward from differentiating (17a)-(17c) with respect to Ys , As , and 
Ks . ￭ 
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Lemma 1 shows that, when an R&D subsidy is implemented, an increased R&D 
investment in the form of an expansion in R&D workers tends to crowd out available 
inputs for the capital-producing and final goods sectors.  The same results applies to 
both Ks  and Ys . 
Now we move to the effects of subsidy policies on balanced growth.  By using 
( )t tx i x=  and (15), the aggregate production function can be arranged as: 
  
ααα
ttYtt KLAY
−−
=
1
,
1
.           (19) 
Taking log and differentiating with respect to time yields the balanced growth rate, 
denoted by ( / )g Y Y≡   , as: 
  KA LLK
K
A
Ag ~~)1(
~
~
~
~
)1(~ αδϕααα +−=+−=

.      (20) 
 The above equation clearly shows that the balanced growth rate is determined by 
both R&D and capital accumulation.  According to Condition 1 and (20), we can 
infer that if ˆϕ ϕ= , the R&D sector shuts down such that economic growth is driven 
only by capital accumulation, as in the AK-type endogenous growth model.  In 
contrast, if ˆδ δ= , the capital production shuts show; in this case, economic growth is 
driven only by R&D and thus our model reduces to the standard Romer model.   
To easily convey our results, we suppose that the government initially does not 
implement any subsidy policies.  Equipped with (17b), (17c), (20) and Lemma 1, we 
can elaborate the growth effects of subsidy policies by the following proposition:  
Proposition 1. The effects of subsidies on balanced growth rate g  are as follows: 
(i) g  is always decreasing in Ys ; 
(ii) g  is increasing in As  if and only if )1)(1/(>/ 23 ααααδϕ +−− ; 
(iii) g  is increasing in Ks  if and only if )1)/(+(1</ ααδϕ − . 
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Proof. Inserting (17b) and (17c) into (20) and differentiating with respect to Ys , As , 
and Ks . ￭ 
 A subsidy to the final-goods sector decreases the labor in the R&D and 
capital-producing sectors, both of which are the engines of growth.  Therefore, it 
always depresses growth.  Whether a subsidy to R&D and capital-producing sectors 
is growth-enhancing or not depends on their relative productivities.  When the 
relative productivity between the R&D and the capital-producing sectors δϕ /  is 
relatively large, the R&D sector is more productive.  Under this situation, it is better 
to subsidize the R&D sector.  When δϕ /  is relatively small, the capital-producing 
sector is more productive; then a subsidy to this sector is more likely to stimulate 
growth.  
 
Appendix (Not for publication) 
 In this appendix we provide the derivation of the labor allocations on the 
balanced growth path (17a)-(17c).  By using equations (5) and (10), we can obtain 
the expression 
, ,
(1 ) (1 )(1 )A t t Y Y t A tv A s L s Yϕ α− = − − .  Differentiating the log of this 
expression with respect to time, and inserting t tY C=  yield: 
,
,
A t t t
A t t t
v A C
v A C
= +
 
.             (A1) 
Then, by inserting 
,
/t t A tA A Lϕ=  and /t t tC C r ρ= −  into (A1), together with (8), 
(10) and the condition ( )
,
1t x t tA Ypi α α= − , we obtain: 
  
(1 )
1
Y Y
A
A
s LL
s
α ρ
ϕ
−
= −
−


,          (A2) 
Following a similar algorithm, we can utilize (5), (13), and the condition 2t t tq K Yα=  
to derive: 
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2(1 )
(1 )(1 )
Y Y
K
K
s LL
s
α ρ
α δ
−
= −
− −


.         (A3) 
 Finally, equations (A2) and (A3) plus the clearing condition for labor market, 
(16), give us the closed-form labor allocations (17a)-(17c) in the main text.  
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